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As society becomes increasingly aware of the fact that
hiring practices have been discriminatory against women,
various solutions have been offered to rectify the situation.
One such solution is preferential hiring, specifically of
women who are less qualified than white males who apply for
the job.

In this way reparations could be made to women

applicants as a matter of compensatory justice.
Many normative and even philosophical questions are
raised by such preferential hiring.

Should such preferen-

tial hiring apply only to women who have been discriminated
against in past hiring situations, or to all women?

Even

though many women have never been discriminated against in
a hiring situation, the vast majority of women are exposed
to discrimination which may have hindered the development
of their job qualifications.

Should women be compensated

for all forms of discrimination by preferential hiring?
Since other groups of people in our society have been discriminated against in the past, do not they deserve such
preferential hiring as well?

If preferential hiring is to

be regarded as compensation for past discrimination, who
should be making the compensation, all employers or those
who·have practiced discrimination in the past?

Are the

employers or- are the white male applicants actually the
ones making the compensation?

"The central questions remain
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whether, when and in what sense compensation can be owed to
a group as a whole, whether ••• women qualify as the proper
kind of group."

(Goldman, 1975:

292)

Initially, compensatory preferential hiring may seem
to be the obvious solution to a history of discriminatory
hiring practices.

Upon closer observations, one discovers

that such preferential hiring may result in causing more
problems than it solves.

I shall argue that compensatory

preferential hiring is unjustified, and I shall argue this
by refuting the main arguments for preferential hiring.

In

addition, I shall refute the narrowest claims for compensatory preferential hiring first and, then, as the claims for
preferential hiring broaden in scope, so shall my arguments
against these claims.
It should be noted at this point the boundaries of the
issue which I shall consider.

Hereafter when I speak of

preferential hiring, I shall be referring only to compensa~

preferential hiring.

Additionally, hereafter it shall

be assumed that the female applicant meets the threshold of
adequate competence.
There are arguments for preferential hiring which have
not been considered, such as utilitarian arguments for the
lessened tensions within society, other teleological arguments for the increased self-esteem of women, and free-market
arguments for increasing the quality of the applicant pool
in the long run.

This paper addresses only the arguments
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for preferential hiring insofar as it is a matter of compensatory justice.

*****
It has been argued that the mere fact that a person is
a woman is sufficient ground for her to deserve preferential
hiring as a matter of compensatory justice.

Of course, some

claim such preferential hiring perpetuates injustice because
it continues to use morally irrelevant grounds for special
advantages.

To counter this claim, the argument is offered

that preferential hiring advantages are not given on morally
irrelevant grounds (i.e. being a woman), but are given on
morally relevant grounds (i.e. having been discriminated
against in the past).

The characteristic of being a woman

has become morally relevant because it was the ground upon
which the woman was discriminated against in the past.
1973)

(Taylor,

Originally the principles of distributive justice were

violated because the woman was discriminated against on morally
irrelevant grounds.

However, based upon the principle of com-

pensatory justice, "which applies only when a violation of
other forms of justice has taken place," the fact that a person is a woman is made morally relevant for purposes of restitution because it was on that basis alone that she was discriminated against originally.

(Taylor, 1973:

179-180)

This argument works only in the cases where a woman who
has been discrimiiia.ted against in a hiring situation in the
past is the one receiving compensation.

Otherwise the
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principles of compensatory justice do not apply because there
has been no injury to the woman.

That is to say that being a

woman did not become a morally relevant factor because that
factor was not the basis for· any prior discrimination in a
hiring situation.

Thus, for those women who have not been

discriminated against in the past in a hiring situation, the
fact that they are women is still morally irrelevant.

Often

in instances of preferential hiring, those women who were
injured by the initial discrimination are not the same women
as those who benefit from preferential hiring.

"Because of

this, preferential hiring is said to be both irrelevant to
the aim of compensating for past injustices and unfair to
those whose superior qualifications are by-passed."
1979:

(Sher,

81}
For compensatory justice there must be "a perfect corre-

lation" between the members of a group now preferred and those
people who have been discriminated against.

"But although

discrimination against minority groups has been widespread,
I do not believe that any of the present generation groups
usually singled out for reverse discrimination can support
this drastic a claim."

(Goldman, 1975:

294)

In reply to

this comment, the argument has been made, "If this is the
only practical way to help a group, the vast majority of
which fully deserves compensation, that objection would only
be grudging."

(Boxill, 1978:

25)

Yet one must question i f

the "vast majority" of women has been discriminated against
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in a hiring situation.

Plainly, preferential hiring cannot

be justified as compensation for the group of women as a whole.
To further support this claim one may look at the sociological definition of a group which states that there must be
interaction between the members and members must play certain
reciprocal roles.

Viewing groups in this sociological sense,

compensatory justice may be justified in that a group has been
directly disadvantaged by discrimination against one or more
of its members.
as a whole.

The member has an integral role in the group

However, since each woman does not interact with

every other woman and does not possess an integral role within the group, discrimination does not injure the group.

Thus

preferential hiring should compensate the individual who was
discriminated against in a hiring situation, but not the group
of women as a whole.

(Goldman, 1975)

In effect, compensa-

tion should be determined by the history of discrimination
against the particular applicant, not by the sex of the injured party.

(Boxill, 1975)

One may argue that even though not every woman has experienced discrimination when applying for a job, most women
have experienced discrimination in some manner which has been
detrimental to her job skills.

Yet there are different levels

of discrimination to which each woman is exposed, so it is
impossible to determine how much each woman should be compensated.

Further, even if it could be determined how much her

skills had been affected, and it was determined that, but for
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the discrimination, she would have been on the same level as
the white male applicant, the person who has made the effort
to develop her skills deserves more than the person who would
have made the effort if he had been discriminated against.
(Sher, 1975)
Most importantly, even assuming that every woman has
been discriminated against in a manner that has been detrimental to the development of her job skills, the single, allencompassing compensation of preferential hiring is unjustified.

If preferential hiring is to be viewed as compensation

for past discrimination, then the reparation must be directly
proportional to the injury.

In addition, of course, assuming

that every woman at some point in time was discriminated
against, in a way which affected her job skills enough to
warrant her deserving preferential treatment in the job market, is assuming far too much.

*****
Yet every woman has been the subject of some form of
prejudice at some point in her life.

Even if there are some

women who have not been overtly down-graded, all women have
experienced a lack of self-respect and a lack of confidence
because of their lowered status in society.
For where a community accepts that a person's ••• being
a woman (is) right and proper grounds for denying that
person full membership in the community, it can hardly
be supposed that any but the most extraordinarily independent woman will escape self-doubt. (Thomson, 1973:
381)
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Thus society owes females and would be remiss if it did not
compensate them.

(Thomson, 1973)

However, why must the compensation for subjection to
prejudice be in the form of jobs?

To give a woman a job

just because she is a female, that is a minimally competent
female, will not increase her self-confidence,

Rather, only

if women believe that they are hired because of their abilities and not merely because they are women will their collective self-confidence increase,
Further, there are many women who have not been at all
economically disadvantaged, in that they are daughters of
wealthy or middle class parents.

These women should not be

given preference over white males who have had disadvantaged
backgrounds.

(Blackstone, 1975)

On the other hand it has been argued that the advantaged would only be competing with the advantaged and the
disadvantaged would only be competing with the disadvantaged.
If the advantaged women were lowered by prejudice so much as
to· compete only with the disadvantaged white male, then obviously the advantaged woman has been discriminated against.
(Boxill, 1978)
It must be noted that this reasoning leaves many questions· unanswered.

For instance, what of the advantaged white

male who is now competing on the same level as the female
applicant?

By parallel reasoning, if the advantaged male were

lowered to such a position then he must have been discriminated against in the past.

In any case, the argument actually
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considers only an idealistic world where a person's status
as a job applicant is a direct result of her past advantages
and naturally has the same status as others with similar advantages.

Also, the argument does not consider the situation

where a disadvantaged white male puts forth a great deal of
effort and achieves the status of an advantaged woman who may
have put forth little effort.

The argument would automatically

attribute the equality of status to past discrimination against
the woman which would be, at best, jumping to conclusions.

*****
Against preferential hiring, there is the argument that
if preferential hiring is put into effect because women have
been discriminated against in the past, then the same thing
must be done for other minorities as well.
be considered a minority.
in the United States.

Even WASP's may

In actuality there is no majority

Additionally, having different minor-

ity groups compete against one another in order to receive
preferential hiring would result in producing power struggles
and popularity contests.

(Newton, 1973)

In the preceding argument, however, even though there
was the claim that WASP's are a minority, there was no claim
that WASP's as a group have been discriminated against.

True,

the United States is comprised of minority groups, but not all
minorities have suffered discrimination.

Further, among those

who have, they have not suffered in equal amounts.

The mere

fact that a minority group has suffered discrimination does
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not put it on the same level as all other minority groups
and does not automatically justify preferential hiring of
the members of the group.

So the preceding argument against

preferential hiring is unsound.

But also, the reasons that

it is unsound remind us that to claim that women have been
discriminated against is not to claim that women have

suf~

fered enough to warrant preferential hiring as compensation.

*****
Judith Jarvis Thomson compares the situation of females
to that of veterans trying for civil service jobs.

Both

should be preferred because of what society owes them.

If

a woman, who has had a feminist upbringing, encouragement to
achieve and has been raised in an upper-middle class family,
gets a job before a poor struggling applicant, could this be
considered unjust?

Thomson maintains that it is as unjust

as an unscarred upper-middle class veteran being preferred to
a poor, struggling nonveteran.

Even in a case where the can-

didate was hired at random, the poor, struggling man would
lose out.

In reality, any method of choosing candidates

would have this result, other than one which chooses candidates based upon the difficulty of their lives.

(Thomson,

1977)
Yet it is easy to recognize Thomson's comparison as a
weak one.

I am here concerned with the case of a veteran

trying for a civil service job and getting preference for
it only insofar as it can be seen as a case of compensatory
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justice.

The injured party is getting compensation by the

injurer, which is directly proportional to the injury.

Not

every veteran is wounded in battle but many were taken away
from their jobs or job opportunities in order to serve the
government.

According to Thomson's reasoning, every male

should be given preference for civil service jobs because
males live with the fear that they may some day be drafted.
Thomson does make a valid point, while almost contradicting herself, that any method of choosing candidates,
other than one based upon the difficulty of their lives,
would have the effect of occasionally neglecting the fact
that some of the candidates had disadvantaged pasts.

But

one, for the sake of practicality, cannot hire applicants,
even adequately competent applicants, solely on the basis
of how disadvantaged their backgrounds have been.
my view is that people should be hired on their

Rather

qualifica~

tions alone; not because they have experienced some past
privations.

*****
As noted previously, a justification offered for preferential hiring is that it may be regarded as a form of compensatory justice.

Females are regarded as the injured

party and white males as the injurers.

However, citing the

"common sense principles," the claim has been made that the
injurer is responsible to the injured party for the wrong
that was committed.

In response to the argument that women
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who have been discriminated against in hiring situations in
the past deserve compensation, but other women do not, the
claim is made "(at best) the wrongdoer has an imperfect obligation to compensate the group."

(Bayles, 1973:

306)

But this line of reasoning does not recognize the need .
for the employer to have been part of any wrongdoing.

To

be sure, by being a member of the group which did the discriminating, the employer, it might be said, was a member
of the group which received the benefits.

(Bayles, 1973)

In saying that the group of employers who discriminated
against female applicants received benefits, it should be
noted that these employers may have been put at a disadvantage as well.

To have hired a white male when a female may

have been more qualified for the job, in fact, may have had
a negative effect upon the business.

Even so, to say that

one employer received benefits because he hired only white
males is to say that other employers suffered because they
did,not hire only white males and thus did not receive "benefits".· Therefore, the fact that some employers received
"benefits" for their discriminatory hiring practices, does
not obligate all other employers to hire less qualified
female applicants.

Hence, non-discriminatory employers

should not be obligated to compensate female applicants for
the injuries-incurred to them by discriminatory employers.
Nevertheless, even if the discriminatory employers decided to compensate for their past practices and preferentially
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hire women, is it the employer who is making the reparations,
or is it actually the. white male applicant?

*****
The claim has been made that preferential hiring does
not penalize the white male applicant with superior qualifications.

Even if he is not to blame for discriminatory prac-

tices of the past, since he has had more benefit from the
discriminatory practices, it is fair that he relinquish his
unfair advantage and compete on an equal level with applicants who have been the object of past discrimination.

(Sher,

1975)
It is obvious what benefits white male applicants have
received from having been hired preferentially over females.
However according to that argument, it is exactly these men,
the ones who have already been hired, who should relinquish
their unfair advantages.

But it would be admittedly highly

impractical to request that all the white males in the United
States relinquish their unfair advantages, and give the jobs
which they already hold to women.
Even if there were a particular woman who had been discriminated against in the past, the man who at present holds
the job should not be obligated to give his job to her, even
though he has been receiving the benefits of the employer's
discriminatory hiring practices.

For if the employer pref-

erentially hires a female applicant over a male applicant
who has received the benefits of discrimination in the past,
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the employer is still"acting unjustly.

The white male appli-

cant may have benefitted from society, but he has done so involuntarily, so he is not the one who owes compensation.
(Fullinwider, 1975)
The claim has been made that the white male should make
reparations to females even when he may not have intentionally
discriminated against women in the past.

If society main-

tained and supported discrimination against women in the past,
then society is obligated to compensate all women for the
injustice.
The issue of the justifiability'of reverse discrimination does not have to do with an individual's making up
for his own acts of injustice against this or that
person. (Taylor, 1973: 181)
Thus preferential hiring is justifiable in that it rights "the
wrongs committed as an integral part of an organized social
practice whose very essence was to discriminate against women."
(Taylor, 1973:

181)

The victim of the past discrimination

was the group of women since they became a collective object
of an unjust institutionalized practice.

Thus because an in-

stitutionalized injustice has occurred, an institutionalized
compensation is required.

Any man in the society has a duty

to comply with and support the practice of preferential hiring
which society has decreed.

(Taylor, 1973)

However it could

,_,,,

be that it was the unquestioned support of what society has
decreed which could have caused discrimination against women
to occur initially.
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It must be noted that not all white males have directly
benefitted from past discriminatory hiring practices.

The

white male applicant who,is in the job market for the first
time has not received any such benefits.

Actually it is the

white male applicant who is the least likely to be receiving
the benefits of discriminatory hiring practices•

It is

quite possible that he does not have a job, that is why he
is applying for one.

To assume that it is the white male

applicant who is receiving the benefits of having been hired
preferentially would be erroneous in many instances.

True,

the white male applicant may have been hired preferentially
in the past, but, again, it would be unfair to assume that
all white male applicants have benefitted in this way.

In

addition, as was mentioned previously, even if some white
male applicants did benefit in this way, they did so involuntarily.
Against this argument, there is the claim that preferential hiring does not place the burden of compensation upon
white males because the jobs which they have are not being
taken away from them.

Instead the white male is denied an

equal opportunity for a job.

This is not something which he

gives,to women to compensate for his past deeds.

Rather it

should',be regarded as the community taking the opportunity
from him to make amends to women.

Jobs are the best form of

compensation since that is what will best reinstate women's
dignity and self-respect.

So white males have to pay the
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price since they have what society wishes to give to females.
White males have had the advantages of self-respect and selfesteem so they should be willing to let women have a chance.
(Thomson, 1973)
But, this practice does discriminate against the white
male applicant because society is taking away his opportunity
for a job so that society can make amends for its past injustices.

As with the example of robbing Peter to pay back

Pauline, the discrimination is merely reversed and is now
against the white male applicant because of society's past
mistakes.

Again, it is not the white male applicants who

have what women "are owed," but the white male jobholders.
Therefore they are the ones who should compensate the women
if anyone should.

After all, it is the white male jobholder

who is reaping the benefits of self-esteem and self-respect
from his job.

* * * * *
The above criticisms of the main arguments for compensatory preferential hiring contain the following case against
it,

(Again, this paper addresses only the arguments for

preferential hiring as a matter of compensatory justice, and
no other. cases for or against preferential hiring.)

Women

who receive· the benefits of preferential hiring are often
not the same women who received the initial hiring discrimination.

Even if these women have in the past been discrimi-

nated against in some manner, that does not warrant their
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being given preferential treatment in a hiring situation.
Many groups have been discriminated against in the past and
it would be virtually impossible to determine which applicant has overcome the most hardships, even if every applicant is a member of only one group, because many people are
members of more than one group.

Besides, an applicant's

qualifications, not his or her underprivileged background,
should determine his or her desirability as an applicant.
If anyone needs to make compensations, the employers who
formerly practiced hiring discrimination are the ones who
should do so; but to do so through preferential hiring
would merely serve to discriminate against the current white
male applicants.
Justice should be seen as "equal treatment under the
law for all citizens."

(Newton, 1973:

310)

Thus injustice

can be interpreted as discrimination for or against a group
of citizens on bases other than those upon which they should
be fairly judged.

Therefore, preferential hiring can be

equated with the original discrimination in a hiring situation against females.

Both are forms of discrimination and

both undermine the public equality which is granted by citizenship and alter the grounds upon which choices among applicants are made.

(Newton, 1973)
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